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Abstract. The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays
remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces various ways to consider efficiency and
equity simultaneously. Lower (higher) discount rates lead to higher (lower) emission reduction. Higher
(lower) inequity aversion leads to higher (lower) emission abatement, unless one also considers the
negative effects of OECD emission reduction on the exports of developing countries; in that case,
the effect of inequity aversion is ambiguous. In the absence of international co-operation, higher
(lower) risk aversion leads to lower (higher) emission abatement. With international co-operation,
the effect of risk aversion is ambiguous because the higher risk aversion gives more weight to
poorer regions and poorer generations. We analyse four ways to introduce compassion in a non-
co-operative setting. If observed development aid is a guide, international altruism is small and has
little impact on optimal emission control. If countries act as if they ‘feel’ but not ‘physically expe-
rience’ the climate impact of the most vulnerable country, optimal emission reduction increases,
but not substantially so. However, if countries actually have to pay for the damage done, they
would prefer to reduce their emissions to much lower levels. Finally, if countries pay as much for
emission reduction as other countries suffer from climate change, (that is, if climate policy restores
the income distribution to what it would have been without climate change), emissions are rapidly
cut to very low levels.
Key words: altruism, climate change, climate economics, efficiency, equity, greenhouse gas emission
reduction, inequity aversion, Kant, no-envy, polluter pays principle, Rawls, risk aversion 
1.  Introduction
Greenhouse gas emissions and vulnerability to climate change show a strong
negative correlation. This is the moral issue at the heart of the climate problem.
Yet, the literature – see Banuri et al. (1996) and Toth (1999) for an overview –
pays little attention to this, particularly not in a structured or quantitative way. One
may argue that equity is an additional reason to abate greenhouse gas emissions.
However, emission reduction also has implications for international income dis-
tribution. The equity implications of climate change impacts have to be carefully
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balanced against the equity implications of greenhouse gas emission reduction.
This paper is an attempt to do so.
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to advice on desirable emission
abatement. One approach follows the Framework Convention on Climate Change
and tries to define a safe, maximum atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases
(e.g., Alcamo and Kreileman 1996; Toth et al. 1997). This approach ignores the
fact that trying to avoid inequities of climate change may invoke more serious
inequities of emission abatement. Substantial attention is given, however, to the
equitable, international distribution of the burden imposed by the emission reduc-
tion target (Barrett 1992; Bosello and Roson 2000; Buonanno et al. 2000; LeCocq
et al. 2000; Ridgley 1996; Rose 1992; Rose and Stevens 1993; Rose et al. 1998).
Cost-effectiveness is important in this, as it minimises total costs so that, in prin-
ciple, everyone can be made better off (although this is typically not done).
Manne and Richels (1995, 1996, 1998) derive a cost-effective path towards a given
concentration target. Tol (1999f) complements cost-effectiveness with intertem-
poral equity. However, these papers all ignore the equity implications of selecting
a concentration target.
The other approach to deriving emission and concentration targets, in prin-
ciple, includes the distributional trade-offs. However, attempts to derive greenhouse
gas emission reductions so as to maximise human welfare are without exception
based on a narrow neo-classical interpretation of justice (e.g., Maddison 1995;
Manne et al. 1995; Nordhaus 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994; Nordhaus and Yang 1996;
Peck and Teisberg 1991, 1994, 1995, 1996; Tol 1997, 1999a). ‘Maximum welfare’
is interpreted to mean ‘Pareto optimal’. That is, the status quo (no climate policy)
is the base situation and climate policy needs to make everybody better off, at least
potentially (cf. Farrow 1998). The inequities of a ‘do nothing’ policy have no place
in this framework. In fact, the analysis operates under the ‘victim pays prin-
ciple’: countries that suffer most from climate change are expected to convince
large emittors to abate (Tol 1997); the victims either pay for emission abatement
or suffer the – uncompensated! – consequences of climate change.
Yet, the cost-benefit approach is closer to including equity than is the safe
concentration approach. Therefore, we try in this paper to extend welfare max-
imisation to considering justice. Roemer (1996) and Sen (1982, 1987) champion
this at a theoretic level. We take a more pragmatic approach. This paper builds
on Tol (2002, forthcoming c). However, we use a newer version of the model,
we extend the number of equitable alternatives to standard cost-benefit analysis,
and we add the effects of international trade and investment.
A number of alternatives are presented, and their results demonstrated with
FUND, an integrated assessment model (cf. Weyant et al. 1996, for an overview
of such models). The first alternative derives from the basic message of Emanuel
Kant (do not do to others what you do not want them to do to you) with a Rawlsian
flavour (the ‘other’ being the least well-off region). The second alternative is based
on the thought that, for all regions for all times, the sum of costs of emission reduc-
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tion and the costs of climate change should be equal. Thus, the inequities of the
no-climate-change scenario are maintained (whereas, in a no-policy-scenario,
inequities would deteriorate). Such relative no-envy solutions often prove a prag-
matic way out in everyday policy making. The other alternatives have more
similarity to conventional economic theory. We first do a sensitivity analysis around
the discount rate and risk aversion. In a fourth alternative, a global welfare function
is maximised that explicitly includes distaste for inequity. This alternative has roots
in neo-classical economics, but cannot distinguish between inequities of climate
change, inequities of emission reduction, and inequities of other causes. A further
alternative introduces altruism. Again, altruism does not distinguish between
sources of inequity. A final alternative is again deeply rooted in neo-classical
economics. The polluter pays principle is rigorously implemented.
These alternatives are analysed with the FUND model. Although model results
should always be interpreted with great care – particularly if the analysis relies
on a single model only – modelling does force one to be rigorous and precise.
The analyses below show that apparently strong equity positions have little effect,
while apparently weaker equity principles have a much stronger effect on emission
reduction. Also, modelling forces one to consider details and subtleties that are
easily overlooked in qualitative analyses, but that turn out to be important for
the results.
The next section presents the model. Sections 3 to 7 present the results for
the six alternatives, starting with the approaches more in line with neo-classical
economics. Section 8 concludes.
2.  The model
The model used is version 2.1 of the Climate Framework for Uncertainty,
Negotiation and Distribution (FUND). Version 2.0 of FUND is the same as version
1.6, described and applied by Tol (1997, 1999a–e, 2001, forthcoming c), except
for the impact module, which is described by Tol (2002a,b).1 Version 2.1 differs
from version 2.0 in that it allows for more general utility and welfare functions
and international trade effects.
Essentially, FUND consists of a set of exogenous scenarios and endogenous per-
turbations. The model is specified for nine major world-regions: OECD-America
(excl. Mexico); OECD-Europe; OECD-Pacific (excl. South Korea); Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; Middle East; Latin America; South
and Southeast Asia; Centrally Planned Asia; and Africa. The model runs from 1950
to 2200, in time steps of a year. The prime reason for starting in 1950 is to ini-
tialise the climate change impact module. In FUND, climate impacts are assumed
to depend on the impact of the year before, to reflect the process of adjustment
to climate change. Because the starting values in 1950 cannot be approximated
very well, climate impacts (both physical and monetized) are misrepresented in
the first few decades. This would bias optimal control if the first decades of the
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simulation coincided with the first decades of emission abatement. Similarly, the
22nd century is included to provide the forward-looking agents in the 21st century
with a long time horizon. The calculated optimal emission reductions in 2100–2200
have little meaning (or policy relevance) in and of themselves.
The IMAGE database (Batjes and Goldewijk 1994) is the basis for the calibration
of the model to the period 1950–1990. Scenarios for the period 2010–2100 are
based on the EMF14 Standardised Scenario, which lies between IS92a and IS92f
(cf. Leggett et al. 1992). Note that the original EMF14 Standardised Scenario
had to be adjusted to fit FUND’s nine regions and yearly time-step. The period
1990–2010 is a linear interpolation between observations and the EMF14
Standardised Scenario. The period 2100–2200 is an extrapolation of the EMF14
Standardised Scenario. This scenario is similar to the IPCC IS92a scenario (Leggett
et al. 1992), and thus to the SRES A2 scenario (Nakicenovic and Swart 2001).
The scenarios concern the rate of population growth, urbanisation, economic
growth, autonomous energy efficiency improvements, the rate of decarboniza-
tion of the energy use (autonomous carbon efficiency improvements), and emissions
of carbon dioxide from land use change, methane and nitrous oxide. The scenario
for economic growth is displayed in Figure 1. An important feature of this is
the assumed economic convergence between regions. The average income gap
between the richest and the poorest region is assumed to fall from the current
50 to about 10.
All climate change scenarios assume economic convergence, so it is unfortu-
nately impossible to perform a sensitivity analysis on this assumption – even though
data for the last forty years do not unambiguously support convergence. In a
diverging world, the equity concerns of greenhouse gas emission reduction are
even more profound than the analyses below indicate.
The scenarios of economic and population growth are perturbed by the impact
of climate change. Population falls with climate change deaths, resulting from
changes in heat stress, cold stress, malaria, and tropical cyclones. Heat and cold
stress are assumed to affect only the elderly, non-reproductive population. The
other sources of mortality do affect the number of births. Heat stress only affects
urban populations. The share of urban in the total population is, up to 2025,
based on the World Resources Databases; after 2025, urban population slowly con-
verges to 95% of total population (comparable to present day Belgium or Kuwait).
Population also changes with climate-induced migration between the regions.
Immigrants are assumed to assimilate immediately and completely with the host
population.
The tangible impacts of climate change are dead-weight losses to the economy.
Consumption and investment are reduced, without changing the saving’s rate.
Climate change thus reduces long-term economic growth, although in the short
term consumption takes a deeper cut. Economic growth is also reduced by carbon
dioxide emission abatement.
The energy intensity of the economy and the carbon intensity of the energy
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supply autonomously decrease over time. This process can be hastened by abate-
ment policies.
The endogenous parts of FUND consist of the atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide, the global mean temperature, the impact
of carbon dioxide emission reductions on economy and emissions, and the impact
of the damages of climate change on the economy and the population.
Methane and nitrous oxide are taken up in the atmosphere, and then geomet-
rically depleted:
Ct = Ct – 1 + 
 
αEt – β(Ct – 1 – Cpre) (1)
where C denotes concentration, E emissions, t year, and pre pre-industrial.
Table I displays the parameters for both gases. 
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Figure 1. Projected per capita income in FUND’s nine regions in the case without greenhouse gas
emission control and without climate change. Also displayed, on the right axis, is the ratio of
average per capita income of the richest and the poorest region.
Table I. Parameters of equation (1).
Gas αa βb pre-industrial concentration
Methane (CH4) 0.3597 1/8.6 790 ppb
Nitrous oxide (N2O) 0.2079 1/120 285 ppb
a The parameter α translates emissions (in million metric tonnes of CH4 or N2O) into concen-
trations (in parts per billion by volume).
b The parameter β determines how fast concentrations return to their pre-industrial (and assumedly
equilibrium) concentrations; 1/β is the atmospheric life-time (in years) of the gases.
Source: After Schimel et al. (1996).
The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide follows from a five-box model:
Boxi, t = ρiBoxi, t – 1 + 0.000471αiEt (2a)
with
where αi denotes the fraction of emissions E (in million metric tonnes of carbon)
that is allocated to box i (0.13, 0.20, 0.32, 0.25 and 0.10, respectively) and ρ
the decay-rate of the boxes (ρ = exp(–1/lifetime), with life-times infinity, 363,
74, 17 and 2 years, respectively). The model is due to Meier-Reimer and
Hasselmann (1987), its parameters are due to Hammitt et al. (1992). Thus, 13%
of total emissions remains forever in the atmosphere, while 10% is – on average
– removed in two years. Carbon dioxide concentrations are measured in parts
per million by volume.
Radiative forcing for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide are based on
Shine et al. (1990). The global mean temperature T is governed by a geometric
build-up to its equilibrium (determined by radiative forcing RF ), with a half-
time of 50 years. In the base case, global mean temperature rises in equilibrium
by 2.5 °C for a doubling of carbon dioxide equivalents, so:
Global mean sea level is also geometric, with its equilibrium level determined
by the temperature and a life-time of 50 years. Temperature and sea level are
calibrated to the best guess temperature and sea level for the IS92a scenario of
Kattenberg et al. (1996).
The climate impact module is based on Tol (2002). A limited number of cat-
egories of the impact of climate change are considered: agriculture, forestry sea
level rise, cardiovascular and respiratory disorders related to cold and heat stress,
malaria, dengue fever, schistosomiasis, energy consumption, water resources, and
unmanaged ecosystems. 
People can prematurely die (because of temperature stress or vector-borne
diseases) or migrate (because of sea level rise). These effects, like all impacts,
are monetized. The value of a statistical life is set at 200 times the per capita
income. The resulting value of a statistical life lies in the middle of the observed
range of values in the literature (cf. Cline 1992). The value of emigration is set
at 3 times the per capita income (Tol 1995, 1996), the value of immigration at 40%
of the per capita income in the host region (Cline 1992).
Dryland and wetland loss due to sea level rise are explicitly modelled. Dryland
loss is valued at $4 million per square kilometre on average in the OECD in
1990 (cf. Fankhauser 1994). Dryland value is assumed proportional to GDP per
square kilometre. Wetland loss is valued at $2 million per square kilometre on
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5
∑
i = 1
(2b)Ct = αiBoxi, t
( ) (3)Tt = RFtTt – 1 +1 – 150 150 2.56.3 ln(2)
average in the OECD in 1990 (cf. Fankhauser 1994). Wetland value is assumed
to be logistic in per capita income. Coastal protection is based on cost-benefit
analysis, including the value of additional wetland lost due to dike building and
consequent coastal squeeze.
Other impact categories (agriculture, forestry, energy, water, ecosystems) are
directly expressed in money, without an intermediate layer of impacts measured
in their ‘natural’ units.
Damage can be due to either the rate of change (benchmarked at 0.04 °C/yr)
or the level of change (benchmarked at 2.5 °C). Benchmark estimates are displayed
in Table II. Damage in the rate of temperature change slowly fades, reflecting
adaptation.
Impacts of climate change on energy consumption, agriculture and cardiovas-
cular and respiratory diseases explicitly recognise that there is a climate optimum.
A mix of factors, including plant physiology and farmer behaviour, determines
the climate optimum. Impacts are positive or negative depending on whether
climate is moving towards or away from that optimum climate. Impacts are larger
if the initial climate is further away from the optimum climate. These impacts
are modelled as second-order polynomials. The optimum climate concerns the
potential impacts. Actual impacts lag behind potential impacts, depending on the
speed of adaptation. The impacts of not being fully adapted to the new climate
are always negative.
Other impacts of climate change, on coastal zones, forestry, unmanaged ecosys-
tems, water resources, malaria, dengue fever and schistosomiasis, are modelled
as simple power functions, mostly linear or quadratic. Impacts are either negative
or positive, but do not change sign.
Damage is distinguished between tangible (market) and intangible (non-market)
effects. Tangible damages affect investment and consumption; through investment,
economic growth is affected; through consumption, welfare is affected. Intangible
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Table II. Estimated impacts of a 1 °C increase in the global mean temperature. Standard
deviations are given in brackets.
Billion dollar Percent of GDP
OECD-A 175 (107) 03.4 (2.1)
OECD-E 203 (118) 03.7 (2.2)
OECD-P 032 0(35) 01.0 (1.1)
CEE&fSU 057 (108) 02.0 (3.8)
ME 004 00(8) 01.1 (2.2)
LA 0–1 00(5) –0.1 (0.6)
S&SEA –14 00(9) –1.7 (1.1)
CPA 009 0(22) 02.1 (5.0)
AFR –17 00(9) –4.1 (2.2)
Source: Tol (forthcoming a).
damages affect welfare directly. Note that climate change does not affect the
savings’ rate. Including this feature would greatly complicate the numerical opti-
misation techniques for the model; Nordhaus (1994) does this, and finds that the
impact of climate change on the savings’ rate is minimal. In addition, the assump-
tion of a fixed savings’ rate allows us to study the equity effects on greenhouse
gas emission reduction in isolation from the equity effects on investment and
growth.
Vulnerability changes with population growth, economic growth, and techno-
logical progress. Some systems are expected to become more vulnerable, such
as water resources (with population growth), heat-related disorders (with urbani-
sation) and ecosystems and health (with higher values from higher per capita
incomes). Other systems are projected to become less vulnerable, such as energy
consumption (with technological progress), agriculture (with economic growth)
and vector-borne diseases (with improved health care).
The result of all this is a complex climate change impact profile, a highly
non-linear function of climate and society. Figure 2 exemplifies this.
Figure 3 displays per capita income without climate policy but with climate
change. Comparing Figures 1 and 3, the equity dimension of climate change is
very clear. According to FUND, climate change will reverse the assumed con-
vergence of per capita income. Climate change impacts will substantially slow
economic growth in poor countries, and may even reverse it in some.
Emission abatement is restricted to carbon dioxide originating from industry,
utilities, transport and households. Land use change is excluded. The costs of
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Figure 2. Monetised climate change impacts in FUND’s nine regions in the scenario without
greenhouse gas emission reduction.
carbon dioxide emission reduction are based on the survey results of Hourcade
et al. (1996), supplemented with results of Rose and Stevens (1993) for developing
countries. From these sources, average cost estimates, as well as their standard
deviations, are calculated for the regions and the world as a whole. Regional
relative costs are shrunk to the global average, that is, the weighted average of
the regional and global average is taken, with the inverse variances as weights.
This reduces the influence of a single study. It particularly influences the devel-
oping regions, for which much less information on emission abatement costs is
available. Costs are represented by a quadratic function. Table III presents the
parameters. Roughly, a 1% cut in emissions costs 0.02% of GDP; a 10% cut
costs 2%.2
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Figure 3. Projected per capita income in FUND’s nine regions in the case without greenhouse gas
emission control and without climate change. Also displayed, on the right axis, is the ratio of
average per capita income of the richest and the poorest region.
Table III. Parameters of the CO2 emission reduction cost function.a
OECD-A 2.08 CEE&fSU 2.05 S&SEA 2.13
OECD-E 2.32 ME 2.10 CPA 1.95
OECD-P 2.22 LA 2.13 AFR 2.09
a The proportional loss of GDP C in year t of proportional emission reduction R in year t follows:
Ct = aRt2. The costs to GDP are modelled as a dead-weight loss to the economy. Emission
reduction is brought about by a permanent shift in energy- and carbon-intensity.
Source: After Hourcade et al. (1996) and Rose and Stevens (1993).
Emission reduction in one region also affects economic growth in other regions.
First of all, the international market in fossil fuels would change, with lower
demands and prices for coal and oil. This benefits countries that import fossil fuels
and do not reduce emissions. Second, countries with little emission abatement
and substantial exports of energy-intensive products would gain competitive advan-
tages over producers of energy-intensive products with substantial emission
reduction. Third, overall lower growth would imply overall lower international
trade, where exporters of primary commodities are hardest hit. These effects can
only be assessed with a computable general equilibrium effects. In this study,
we use results from WAGEM (Kemfert 2000).
WAGEM is an intertemporal computable general equilibrium and multi regional
trade model for the global economy. It considers 11 world regions – see Table
IV – that are linked through bilateral sectoral trade flows based on GTAP3 data
of 1995. WAGEM distinguishes 13 sectors, viz. coal; crude oil; natural gas; elec-
tricity; petroleum and coal products; iron and steel; chemicals, rubber and plastics;
non-ferrous metals; non-metal mineral products; agriculture; pulp and paper;
transport; and other goods and services.
For each region, a representative agent maximises lifetime utility from con-
sumption – see (4). This determines the level of savings. Firms choose investment
in order to make the most of the present value of their companies. In each region,
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Table IV. Regions in WAGEM and FUND.
WAGEM Countries FUND Countries
ASIA India, South Korea, Indonesia, S&SEA South and Southeast Asia
Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan
CHN China CPA China
CNA Canada, New Zealand and Australia
EU15 European Union OECD-Europe Western Europe
JPN Japan OECD-Pacific Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand
LSA Latin America LA Latin America
MIDE Middle East and North Africa ME Middle East
REC Russia, Eastern and Central CEE&fSU Central and Eastern 
European Countries Europe and the former 
Soviet Union
ROW Rest of the World
SSA Sub Saharan Africa AFR Africa
USA United States of America OECD-America USA and Canada
production of the non-energy macro good is captured by an aggregate produc-
tion function. The production function characterises technology through transforma-
tion possibilities on the output side and substitution possibilities on the input
side. In each region, a representative household chooses to allocate lifetime income
across consumption in different time periods in order to maximise lifetime utility.
In each period, households face the choice between current consumption and future
consumption, which can be purchased via savings. The trade-off between current
consumption and savings is given by a constant intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution. Producers invest as long as the marginal return on investment equals
the marginal cost of capital formation. The rates of return are determined by a
uniform and endogenous world interest rate such that the marginal productivity
of a unit of investment and a unit of consumption is equalised within and across
countries, but investment in poorer economies is constrained to “realistic” levels.
Domestic and imported varieties for the non-energy good for all buyers in the
domestic market are treated as imperfect substitutes by a CES Armington aggre-
gation function, with a constant elasticity of substitution.
WAGEM contains all assumptions of a standard CGE, and therefore all its
criticisms. Unfortunately, however imperfect CGE models are, there is no viable
alternative for applied work. Fortunately, none of the debatable assumptions of
WAGEM has great influence on the conclusions of this paper.
Several runs were made with WAGEM, with various emission reduction targets
in the OECD. Although WAGEM runs to they year 2050, we only use results
for the year 2010, when trade patterns can be expected to be still relatively
similar to the calibration year 1995.
The results of this are used to calibrate FUND, where trade effects are assumed
to be linear in emission reduction.4 The regions of WAGEM roughly match the
FUND regions – see Table IV; WAGEM’s trade effects are expressed as a per-
centage of GDP, and inserted in FUND. In 2010, the scenarios underlying FUND
and WAGEM are virtually identical.5 Emission reduction costs in one region are
assumed to lead to a proportional loss of economic growth in other regions,
according to the parameters of Table V. Roughly, a 1% reduction in growth in
the OECD would cost other regions between 0.5 and 4.5% of their GDP.
In FUND, each region has its own decision maker, nine in total. FUND also
distinguishes generations of decision makers, twenty in total. Thus, there are
9 × 20 = 180 decision makers in the model.6 Each decision maker has control
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Table V. Effect of emission reduction costs in the OECD on other regions’ growth.
Region CEE&fSU ME LA S&SEA CPA AFR
Effecta 4.62 2.63 0.53 0.46 0.53 1.08
a If emission reduction slows economic growth in the OECD by 1% on average, than economic
growth slows by effect %.
over a ten-year period only. Each decision maker maximises the net present welfare
of her region (in the non-co-operative cases) from the start of the control period
up to 2200. Thus, the first decision maker maximises welfare in the period
2000–2200, discounted to 2000, by abating emissions in the period 2000–2009.
The second decision maker maximises welfare in the period 2010–2200, discounted
to 2010, by abating emissions in the period 2010–2019. And so on. Welfare is
defined as the natural logarithm of per capita income. The discount rate is one
per cent per year. In the case of global co-operation, the unweighted sum of the
net present regional welfares is maximised (see Section 5). Each decision maker
knows the emission reduction efforts of all decision makers in all regions at all
times. The equilibrium is found iteratively. That is, in the first iteration, each
decision maker controls emissions so as to maximise net present welfare, assuming
that the other decision makers do nothing. In the second iteration, each decision
maker acts assuming that the other decision makers do as in the first iteration.
And so on, until convergence.
3.  Risk aversion and time preference
Figure 4 displays the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the
business as usual scenario, the non-co-operative optimal control scenario, and
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Figure 4. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual (no
control scenario), three non-co-operative optimal emission control scenarios with alternative values
for risk aversion, and, three co-operative optimal emission control scenarios with alternative values
for risk aversion.
the co-operative optimal control scenario. In the optimal control scenarios, all para-
meters are set to their base values as described in the previous section. In the
non-co-operative case, regions maximise the net present value of (4), with e = 1,
knowing the optimal actions of other regions. If countries do not co-operate,
optimal emission reduction is small but greater than zero. In the co-operative
case, regions jointly maximise ∑r, tUr, t(1 + ρ)–t. If countries co-operate, optimal
emission reduction is larger, but not large enough to stabilize atmospheric con-
centrations of carbon dioxide. These results are well established.
Figure 7 displays the results for non-co-operative optimal control with and
without trade effects. The difference is small (cf. Figure 8), but emission abate-
ment is slightly higher with than without trade effects. In the non-co-operative
case, regions do not care about their negative impacts on other regions, but slower
growth in less developed regions, particularly China, helps reducing emissions.
Figure 7 is further discussed below.
In the base case, welfare U is defined as the natural logarithm of per capita
income Y. That is, risk aversion is set to unity. A more general welfare function
is
where e denotes risk aversion. Risk aversion determines the curvature of the welfare
function, and thus the relative weight placed on a marginal improvement in the
income of rich and poor. Figure 4 shows optimal atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide if risk aversion is set to zero and two. With a risk aversion of
two, both co-operative and non-co-operative emission control is zero. The reason
is that more weight is placed on the losses of early generations due to emission
abatement. Under the scenario assumptions of the model, the current generation
is the poorest. With a risk aversion of nought, that is, welfare is linear in income,
non-co-operative optimal emission reduction is somewhat higher than in the case
with a risk aversion of unity, as more weight is placed on the plight of future
generations. However, with a risk aversion of nought, co-operative optimal
emission control is lower, as a low risk aversion places little weight on the poorer
countries.
In sum, in the non-co-operative case, optimal emission control is decreasing
in risk aversion, as higher risk aversion places more weight on the current, poorest
generation. In the co-operative case, optimal emission control is first increasing,
then decreasing in risk aversion as the relative weights placed on the poorest
regions and the poorest generations shift.
A similar effect is observed if we introduce trade effects in co-operative optimal
control (see Figure 7 and below). Trade effects increase emission abatement for
low risk aversion, and decrease emission abatement for medium risk aversion. With
low risk aversion, the negative trade effects carry less weight, and the negative
effects of climate change more weight.
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(4)Ur, t = Yr, t
1 – e
1 – e
Figure 5 displays the results for different utility discount rates, or pure rates
of time preference, ranging from 0.1% to 3% per year. (See Arrow et al. 1996;
and Portney and Weyant 2000; for a discussion on discounting.) Unsurprisingly,
higher (lower) discount rates imply lower (higher) emission abatement, and thus
higher (lower) atmospheric concentrations.
Figure 7 compares co-operative optimal emission control with and without
trade effects for the alternative discount rates. In the co-operative case, trade effects
lead to lower emission reduction, because of the negative impacts of trade. This
is more pronounced with a lower than with a higher discount rate, even though
the trade effects are concentrated in the next five decades. Their effects on
economic growth, however, are felt for a much longer period. Figure 7 is further
discussed below.
4.  Inequity aversion and altruism
Usually, co-operative solutions maximise the sum of the welfares of the actors
in the game. There is no reason for this other than convenience. Alternatively,
one could maximise
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Figure 5. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual (no
control scenario), three non-co-operative optimal emission control scenarios with alternative values
for the pure rate of time preference, and, three co-operative optimal emission control scenarios
with alternative values for the pure rate of time preference.
∑
r
(5)Ur
1 – γ
1 – γ
where Ur denotes the welfare of actor r and γ is a parameter, denoting ‘inequity
aversion’. For γ = 0, W equals the conventional sum of welfare. The higher γ,
the more W is determined by the welfare U of the poorer actors. This is easily
seen since γ ↑ ∞ implies that W = min(Ur) – the Rawlsian maximin approach –
and γ ↓ ∞ implies that W = max(Ur) – the Nietzschean maximax approach. If γ
is unity, W is replaced by the – equivalent – product of the actors’ welfares, a
Bernouilli-Nash type of welfare function. Fankhauser et al. (1997) discuss the
implications of alternative welfare specifications for the impact of climate change.
The major drawback of this approach is that it cannot distinguish between
sources of inequity. Inequities arise from many causes, including climate change.
The only policy instrument is greenhouse gas emission reduction. In this speci-
fication, the instrument of emission abatement will be used to reduce inequities
of any origin, not just from climate change.
In our experiment, inequity aversion γ assumes five different values: 0, 1, 2,
5, and 10. Figure 6 displays the results for the atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide. Emissions are reduced more for higher inequity aversion. This is because
of the implicit wealth transfer of climate change and emission reduction. That
is, the costs of greenhouse gas emission reduction by the richer regions counts
less and less for higher γ, while the avoided damages of climate change to the
poorer regions count more and more. Poorer regions are thought to be more
vulnerable to climate change, while welfare maximisation concentrates emission
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Figure 6. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual (no
control scenario), the base non-co-operative optimal emission control scenarios, and five co-opera-
tive optimal emission control scenarios with alternative values for inequity aversion.
reductions in the richer regions. Thus, emission control in the richer regions implies
a welfare transfer to the poor. Emission control increases with inequity aversion,
but even strong inequity aversion is not enough to stabilize atmospheric
concentrations below 1,000 ppm.
Figure 7 displays the differences in results with and without trade effects for
a variety of scenarios. Trade effects are most pronounced in case of inequity
aversion. In the standard co-operative case, that is, with an inequity aversion of
zero, emission control is lower with than without trade effects. That is, the negative
effects of trade on growth in less developed regions is a reason to abate less.
This is more pronounced with inequity aversions of 1 and 10, but the situation
is reversed for intermediate inequity aversion. The explanation lies in the diver-
sity of the poorer regions. Different values of inequity aversion attach different
weights to different regions and time periods. The negative trade effects not only
hurt growth, but they also cut emissions, particularly in China, and this is valued
positively, particularly in Africa and South and Southeast Asia. In principle, one
would expect the effect of trade on optimal emission control to be ambiguous,
and this is what the numerical analysis demonstrates. For further discussion of
Figure 7, see above and below.
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Figure 7. The impact of trade effects on the optimal 2,200 atmospheric concentration of carbon
dioxide, according to five non-co-operative emission control scenarios (b: base case; a: altruism
(a = 0.04); a*: altruism × 10 (a = 0.4); k: Kant-Rawls; v: Varian’s non-envy) and nine co-opera-
tive emission control scenarios, varying the discount rate (0.1, 1, 3%), risk aversion (0, 1, 2) and
inequity aversion (0, 1, 2, 5, 10); displayed are the concentrations with trade minus the concentra-
tions without trade.
The non-co-operative variant of inequity aversion is altruism, that is, one
region’s welfare is also a function of other regions’ welfare. One representation
is
Ui* = Ui + αUj (6)
where U denotes selfish welfare and U* altruistic welfare. The parameter α
measures the extent of altruism. Let us assume that governments in the OECD
maximise (6), and that selfish welfare is measured according to classical utilitar-
ianism. Then (6) turns into
where Y is income, A is aid and P is population. Let us further assume that pop-
ulations and incomes are as in 1990, and that OECD give 1% of their income to
development aid. Then, α = 0.004. If, instead, we assume that welfare depends
on per capita income only, α = 0.04. We use the higher value.
Figure 8 shows the optimal atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide.
Altruism slightly increases emission reduction, but the impact on the atmosphere
is hardly noticeable. This is not surprising, as altruism is so small. Even if we
set α = 0.4, emission abatement is largely unchanged. The reason is that some
regions towards which the OECD displays altruistic feelings actually benefit
from climate change.
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A
(6′)( )Yi – APiPi ln αPj ln ( )Yj + APj ⇒ α = Pi2(Yj + A)Pj2(Yi – A)
Figure 8. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual (no
control scenario), the non-co-operative optimal emission control scenarios with and without trade
effects, and two non-co-operative optimal emission control scenarios with alternative values for
altruism (α = 0.04 and α = 0.4) and with and without trade effects.
Figure 7 compares the results with and without international trade. With a
little altruism, optimal emission reduction increases. With more altruism, optimal
emission abatement decreases. The reasons for this ambiguity are the same as
for the ambiguity with inequity aversion. Figure 7 is further discussed above.
5.  The polluter pays principle and historical responsibility
An alternative way to internalise climate change impacts on other regions is through
the polluter pays principle. Simply put, those that emit pollution compensate
those that suffer the consequences. In reality, it is hard to assess cause and effect,
and to determine adequate compensation. In a model, this is much easier. We
aggregate all climate change impacts, valued at regionally specific values.
Aggregate world damage is then allocated to the regions according to their his-
torical contribution to the enhanced greenhouse effect. Gruebler and Nakicenovic
(1996) estimate accumulated carbon dioxide emissions for the period 1850–1950.
From 1950 onwards, FUND generates emissions. Figure 9 displays cumulative
emissions per region as a fraction of total cumulative emissions. The OECD is
clearly the largest contributor to climatic change in 2000, but its share gradually
declines over time.
Figure 10 displays business as usual concentrations of carbon dioxide with
and without compensation. The OECD pays so much in compensation that its
economies and emissions decline. Other regions grow faster as a result, but the
additional emissions do not make up for the loss of OECD emissions.
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Figure 9. The share of regional cumulative carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel combustion
in global cumulative emissions, according to the business as usual scenario without compensation.
Consequently, business as usual concentrations are lower with than without com-
pensation. This result is model and scenario dependent.
Figure 10 also displays non-co-operative optimal emission control with com-
pensation. The polluter pays principle induces OECD regions in particular, to abate
more emissions. If trade effects are introduced, optimal emission control slightly
falls, because growth in the less developed regions is slowed and their total
impact reduced, so that less compensation needs to be paid.
Trade effects are again small, although less so than in the earlier non-co-
operative control cases. In contrast, trade effects now decrease non-co-operative
optimal control. The reason is that trade effects reduce growth in the poorest
countries, thus increasing their vulnerability and so the amount of compensation
that needs to be paid.
6.  Kant
Do not to others what you do not want to happen to you. It is simple, appealing,
and restraining. It does take a number of additional considerations, though, to make
Kant operational in a climate change context.7 Firstly, there are costs of emission
reduction as well as costs of climate change. However, because of discounting
and the slow workings of the climate system, the maximum current costs of climate
change are likely to exceed the maximum current costs of emission reduction,
and indeed do so in the experiments reported below. Therefore, we restrict our
attention to the costs of climate change. Secondly, there are a great number of
others whose potential discomfort should be internalised. The costs of climate
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Figure 10. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual
(no control scenario) with (PPP) and without compensation, and two non-co-operative optimal
emission control scenarios with and without trade effects.
change to various regions are strongly linked, however. If the costs of the most
vulnerable are reduced to acceptable levels, the costs of the less vulnerable are
likely to have fallen (and indeed are in the below experiments) below accept-
able levels. Thirdly, the costs of climate change to the most vulnerable regions
are not reduced to a pre-ordained level. Instead, less vulnerable regions treat the
relative costs of the most vulnerable region as if these were their own, and perform
a cost-benefit analysis on that basis. That is, the climate change impacts of each
region in each decade is multiplied by a factor At, r =, (minr It, r)/It, r, where It, r
denotes the impact at time t in region r. Fourthly, by focusing on the costs to
the most vulnerable to climate change, the analysis is sensitive to scale. For
instance, in FUND, the Maldives and India are grouped in one region. The impact
on moderately vulnerable India dominates the impact on the highly vulnerable
Maldives. The aggregation in FUND is such that little can be done about this.
Fifthly, optimal emission reductions are calculated in FUND’s non-co-operative
mode.
Figure 11 displays some results. The non-co-operative optimal control scenario
and the Kant-Rawls optimal control scenario are very close together, with a latter
one leading to slightly lower concentrations. This is surprising. The reason is as
follows. Emission control is non-co-operative, also in the Kant-Rawls case, so only
a fraction of the climate change damage is internalised. Also, the Kant-Rawls
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Figure 11. The atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide according to the business as usual
(no control scenario) with (PPP), and the base non-co-operative optimal emission control scenario,
the Kant-Rawls non-co-operative optimal emission control scenario, and the Varian optimal control
scenario with and without trade effects. 
damage is modelled as a loss of welfare, not affecting economic growth. Thus,
even if richer regions experience current impacts on poor countries, the richer
regions do not suffer the dynamic consequences.
Trade effects lead to a slight increase in emission control (see Figure 7 and
above). The earlier result for non-co-operative emission reduction also holds in
this case: Trade effects reduce growth and emissions. As growth is also reduced
in the region with the highest impact, the effect is less pronounced with Kant-
Rawls than in the standard case.
7.  No-envy
Climate change invokes additional inequities, as its impacts are unevenly dis-
tributed and disproportionally affect the poor. Greenhouse gas emission reduction
invokes other inequities. Consider the following thought experiment. The leaders
of all countries and all generations meet to share the joint burden of climate change
and emission reduction. All are committed and no one is inclined to cheat. In
real life, such meetings often agree on an equal effort for all (e.g., an equal per-
centage emission reduction). This is not necessarily equitable (see Rose et al. 1998),
but, if the equal effort is measured in an appropriate metric,8 it does not
introduce a lot of new inequities either. The injustice of the status quo is by and
large maintained.9 Varian (1974) coined the term ‘no-envy’ for such a solution,
and explores its implications.
In the hypothetical meeting of countries and generations, however, the situa-
tion without climate change is taken as the reference case. The sum of the costs
of emission reduction and the costs of climate change, relative to income, is
equalised. This implies that the inequities of the no-climate-change scenario are
more or less maintained. Greenhouse gas emission reduction policy is used to coun-
teract the inequities of climate change, but no more than that.
Figure 11 displays the results. Climate change impacts in some regions are
already so high in the early 21st century that other regions have to spend con-
siderable amounts on emission reduction. As a result, emissions fall dramatically,
almost immediately stabilizing atmospheric concentrations.
If we introduce trade effects, than non-enviable emission reduction is impos-
sible. For, if an OECD region wants to spend as much on emission reduction as
a non-OECD region suffers from climate change consequences, then non-OECD
damage only increases. Therefore, in this case, emission reduction is set to zero
for the periods in which we assumed trade effects. The result is an obvious increase
in atmospheric concentrations (Figures 7 and 11). 
8.  Conclusions
This paper explores welfare maximising carbon dioxide emission reductions that
better adhere to equity issues than does conventional optimal control. Non-
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co-operative emission control does not lead to strong cuts of emissions, even if
the regions are altruistic or adopt a Kantian attitude. The reasons are that global
externalities are only partially internalised, and some regions are less vulnerable
to climate change than others. Some regions may even benefit from climate change,
and denying them this benefit would be very unjust. Trade effects, harmful to
poor regions, only complicate the matter without, however, changing the numer-
ical outcomes very much. The only exception to this is the case in which
compensation is paid for climate change impacts according to historical respon-
sibility. The polluter pays principle, taken literally, is a good deterrent for
greenhouse gas emissions. 
If climate policy aims to restore the income distribution that would have pre-
vailed had there been no climate change, emission reduction should be high. In
fact, in this case, atmospheric concentrations should be stabilized immediately.
If, in a co-operative setting, a premium is put on an equal distribution of per
capita income, emission abatement is stricter than in case that premium is naught.
Risk aversion has an ambiguous impact on optimal emission control. On the
one hand, a higher risk aversion implies a higher weight on the poorer regions.
On the other hand, a higher risk aversion places a higher weight on the short
run.
International trade effects are similarly ambiguous. Trade effects hurt growth
in poorer countries, but they also cut emissions. In the majority of cases, the growth
and associated welfare impact matters most, but there are also exceptions.
The numbers presented in this paper should be treated with great caution, as
they depend on a single parameterisation of a single model.10 The climate change
impact estimates are particularly uncertain, but do drive the numerical results to
a substantial extent. The qualitative results are more important. If one takes the
climate-change-induced inequities into account, and if one wants to manage them
through greenhouse gas emission control, emission abatement should be intensi-
fied.11 International co-operation in emission control is crucial. Strong cuts in
emissions may well be justifiable on the grounds of equity. 
The qualitative results also need some caveats. A number of the methods
presented here (e.g., Kant, inequity aversion) are sensitive to resolution. It does
matter whether one looks at groups of countries, countries, or sector or regions
within countries. This opens the door to differences of interpretation. All presented
methods are dependent on the baseline, and on the metric of expressing costs
and benefits, both of which are open to dispute.
The main caveat, however, is that it is hard to observe concern for equity issues,
other than rhetorical, with the world’s governments (Schelling 1995). The paper
presents academic constructs, no descriptions of the real world. These thought
experiments may, however, help to inform further thinking about how to handle
the enhanced greenhouse effect.
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Notes
01. The source code of both versions 1.6 and 2.0 the model can be found at http://
www.uni-hamburg.de/Wiss/FB/15/Sustainability/fund.html.
02 The model assumes that emission reduction always costs money. Some authors argue that there
are commercial opportunities in greenhouse gas emission reduction that, for some reason, are
not taken up by the market, and that abatement policy would introduce these opportunities at a
benefit to the economy. See Hourcade et al. (1996) for a discussion. The behavioural assump-
tions of this argument are not understood by the current authors.
03. Global Trade Analysis Project, at Purdue University. See http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/
and Hertel (1998).
04. Trade effects are approximately linear in WAGEM.
05. In other respects, for example utility functions and discount rates, the two models are also
comparable. Therefore, the trade effects of WAGEM are roughly equal to the trade effects
FUND would have had, had it had a trade module. That is, WAGEM and FUND are roughly
consistent in the base runs ignoring equity. Below, we also analyse cases in which FUND’s utility
functions and discount rates are distinctly different. This leads to inconsistencies, as the trade
and investment patterns are based on a different world-view than is emission reduction. The
advantage is that it allows us to study the equity effects on optimal emission reduction in
isolation. A fully internally consistent trade, equity and emission reduction model would require
major extensions of either FUND or WAGEM.
06. Alternatively, one could model one decision maker per region with twenty decision periods.
For the purposes of this paper, the two alternative representations would yield identical answers,
but see Tol (1999f, 2001d).
07. Barrett (1992) explores a Kantian burden sharing rule for greenhouse gas emission reduction.
08. Such as human welfare, or even monetary costs; in reality, agreements are often in equal per-
centage emission reduction or something similarly remote from what matters to people.
09. This is much like the Pareto criterion, which takes resource endowments as given.
10. The results here are roughly in line with those of Tol (2001c), but that paper uses a different
version of the same model.
11. Alternatively, induced inequities can be reduced by sponsoring adaptation. This is not pursued
any further here.
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